China's 280MW photovoltaic concession bidding is about to settle, and the results are also expected. 0.7288 yuan / kWh is expected to become the lowest bid price for the on-grid tariffs of these 13 projects. Don't be excited about the PV on-grid price drop of 33% a year. Whether the PV power plant can actually supply power to the grid at the above prices, and whether the total power generation is in line with expectations, you need to be cautious.
Among the above 13 bidding projects, most of the bidding companies that reported the lowest price were central enterprises, of which China Power Investment Group was the most typical. As is known to all, central enterprises have strong financial strength and have the ability to pay for photovoltaic power plants that can only be profitable after 10 or 20 years. This alone is enough for central enterprises to win in this round of bidding for the low price. However, if you look at the long-term perspective, the final success will not be able to draw a full stop here, but should extend to the entire life cycle of the construction process and operational status of the PV power plant. All of these require us to carefully analyze whether these central enterprises are truly qualified to continue to operate the winning photovoltaic power plants.
According to the relevant regulations of the industry, thermal power enterprises need to build a certain proportion of renewable energy installed capacity. This means that central enterprises must pursue a large amount of renewable energy installed capacity to meet the needs of their own development space. At the same time, the SASAC's assessment of power central enterprises is also focused on the surface indicators of power installed capacity, and does not pay equal attention to the power generation capacity and total power generation capacity of power central enterprises. This may be one reason why central enterprises are willing to win the bid at low prices.
Since external factors have led to a focus on installed capacity and power generation has been neglected to some extent, it is not surprising that central enterprises have won the bid to obtain the investment operation qualification of photovoltaic power plants. However, whether they will have enough power to promote the healthy operation of the power station and generate electricity in full, but also have a big question mark.
On the one hand, the reason is that the low-cost winning bid will inevitably face the shackles of the cost of each construction and operation link. If the investor presses the price of the supplier too tightly, then it is difficult for the supplier to "vote with the foot". Even if the supplier is not pressed, the investor will have to bear more pressure and risk, so that Even if there is no problem in the quality of photovoltaic components, how can we guarantee that 100% will not cut corners in the construction of photovoltaic power plants?
In fact, in the construction process of photovoltaic power plants, it is not uncommon to see a variety of work-saving activities in order to reduce costs, and many photovoltaic power plants are thus caught in an embarrassing situation of insufficient output and half-death.
On the other hand, there is currently not enough regulatory force on the periphery to put pressure on PV power plant investors. Without pressure, there is no power. The enthusiasm and motivation of central enterprises to build photovoltaic power plants is naturally not as good as when they win bids at low prices. So, who is responsible for the whole life cycle of photovoltaic power plants? Who can guarantee that the construction of photovoltaic power plants will eventually contribute to the amount of electricity they should send?
What worries many people in the industry is that, for the current photovoltaic power plants with insufficient output, there is actually no department directly responsible for its continuous operation and full power generation. How to prevent the second half of the PV bidding from repeating the same mistakes needs to be left to the PV industry regulators and government decision-making departments to think carefully.
Among the above 13 bidding projects, most of the bidding companies that reported the lowest price were central enterprises, of which China Power Investment Group was the most typical. As is known to all, central enterprises have strong financial strength and have the ability to pay for photovoltaic power plants that can only be profitable after 10 or 20 years. This alone is enough for central enterprises to win in this round of bidding for the low price. However, if you look at the long-term perspective, the final success will not be able to draw a full stop here, but should extend to the entire life cycle of the construction process and operational status of the PV power plant. All of these require us to carefully analyze whether these central enterprises are truly qualified to continue to operate the winning photovoltaic power plants.
According to the relevant regulations of the industry, thermal power enterprises need to build a certain proportion of renewable energy installed capacity. This means that central enterprises must pursue a large amount of renewable energy installed capacity to meet the needs of their own development space. At the same time, the SASAC's assessment of power central enterprises is also focused on the surface indicators of power installed capacity, and does not pay equal attention to the power generation capacity and total power generation capacity of power central enterprises. This may be one reason why central enterprises are willing to win the bid at low prices.
Since external factors have led to a focus on installed capacity and power generation has been neglected to some extent, it is not surprising that central enterprises have won the bid to obtain the investment operation qualification of photovoltaic power plants. However, whether they will have enough power to promote the healthy operation of the power station and generate electricity in full, but also have a big question mark.
On the one hand, the reason is that the low-cost winning bid will inevitably face the shackles of the cost of each construction and operation link. If the investor presses the price of the supplier too tightly, then it is difficult for the supplier to "vote with the foot". Even if the supplier is not pressed, the investor will have to bear more pressure and risk, so that Even if there is no problem in the quality of photovoltaic components, how can we guarantee that 100% will not cut corners in the construction of photovoltaic power plants?
In fact, in the construction process of photovoltaic power plants, it is not uncommon to see a variety of work-saving activities in order to reduce costs, and many photovoltaic power plants are thus caught in an embarrassing situation of insufficient output and half-death.
On the other hand, there is currently not enough regulatory force on the periphery to put pressure on PV power plant investors. Without pressure, there is no power. The enthusiasm and motivation of central enterprises to build photovoltaic power plants is naturally not as good as when they win bids at low prices. So, who is responsible for the whole life cycle of photovoltaic power plants? Who can guarantee that the construction of photovoltaic power plants will eventually contribute to the amount of electricity they should send?
What worries many people in the industry is that, for the current photovoltaic power plants with insufficient output, there is actually no department directly responsible for its continuous operation and full power generation. How to prevent the second half of the PV bidding from repeating the same mistakes needs to be left to the PV industry regulators and government decision-making departments to think carefully.
Motor Magnet,Ndfeb Segment Magnet,Superconducting Magnets
Sunxal Magnetics Co., Ltd. , http://www.hlmagnets.com